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Inconsistent preferences are a cause of time-inconsistency in pol-
icy design. This type of inconsistency entails welfare costs for allo-
cations are associated with Pareto-inefficient competitive equilibria.
This paper builds a general equilibrium model for the characteriza-
tion of allocations induced by Nash-equilibrium taxation policies with
competitive markets.
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1 Introduction
Inconsistent preferences are a cause of time-inconsistency in policy design....
This type of inconsistency entails welfare costs for allocations are associ-
ated with Pareto-inefficient competitive equilibria....
This paper builds a general equilibrium model for the characterization of
allocations induced by Nash-equilibrium taxation policies with competitive
markets.
The paper is organized is organized as follows. Section 2 puts forth the
model of optimal factors income taxation with commitment technology. Sec-
tion 3 extends the infinitely lived agent framework by adding the constraints
implied by the original SGP first, and its revised version subsequently. Sec-
tion 4 shows that implementing the reformed SGP entails an inefficiently
extended duration of capital income taxation. Section 5 illustrates simulated
equilibrium paths. Section 6 ends the paper with a brief summary.
2 Definitions and assumptions
In this Section we set out the framework of analysis that closely follows [6].
Hyperbolic preferences at time t, over the same consumption good at different
time periods are
U (xt, xt+1, ...) = u (xt) + δ
∑∞
i=1
βiu (xt+i) , (1)
where the vector xt = (ct, lt, gt) is a vector of private consumption, labor
supply and government consumption levels. The discount factor of future
utilities is 0 < β < 1.
Assumption 1. The function U (x1, x2, ...) is weakly separable across con-
sumption at different times and homothetic in consumption at different times.
The representative consumer aims at maximizing (1) under the constraint
ct + kt + bt ≤ (1− τt)wtlt +Rkt kt +Rbtbt, t = 1, ...,∞ (2)
where τt denotes the tax rate set on wage, and
Rkt = 1 + (1− θt)(rt − δt) (3)
is the gross return on capital after taxes θ and depreciation δ are deducted
from the before-tax return r. Notice that the government is allowed to set a
return from bonds Rbt different from the gross return on capital.
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The government policy thus consists of setting tax rates on returns from
capital and labor, and a gross return on bonds, such that the exogenous
sequence of government consumption be financed under the budget constraint
bt = R
b
tbt−1 + bt−1 − τtwtlt − θt(rt − δ)kt (4)
Under the budget constraint, the gross return on bonds is implied by tax
rates on labor and capital, so that time t government policy πt is given by
(τt, θt).
We assume existence of a commitment technology, i.e. the government
can commit itself to τ1 and a sequences of couples {τt, θt}t=2,...,∞ announced
at time t = 1.
Definition 1. (Policy) A policy {πt}t=1,...,∞ is a sequences of couples
{τt, θt}t=1,...,∞.
A competitive allocation is defined as follows
Definition 2. (Competitive Allocation, CA.) A CA is such that both the
resource constraint
ct + gt + kt = F (kt, lt) + (1− δ)kt−1, t = 1, ...,∞ (5)
and the first-order maximization condition
U ′(ct) + U
′(lt) = 0, t = 1, ...,∞ (6)
hold.
Definition 3. (Allocation rules, ARs.) Allocation rules are sequences of
functions {xt(π)}t=1,...,∞ that map policies into CAs.
A price system is defined as follows




A competitive price system is defined as follows
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Definition 5. (Competitive Price System, CPS.) A CPS is a triple
(wt, rt, R
b
t), wt = Fl, rt = Fk (8)
Definition 6. (Price Rules, PRs.) Price rules are sequences of func-
tions {wt(π)}t=1,...,∞, {rt(π)}t=1,...,∞, and {Rbt(π)}t=1,...,∞ that map policies
into PSs.
In the present setting individual and aggregate allocations coincide, i.e.
representativeness holds (see [5].) Hence, a competitive equilibrium is de-
fined as follows
Definition 7. (Competitive Equilibrium, CE.) A CE is a policy, a CPS and
an allocation such that (1) is maximized under the consumer’s budget con-
straint (2), and the government budget constraint (4) holds.
A Ramsey equilibrium is defined as follows
Definition 8. (Ramsey Equilibrium, RE.) A RE is a policy, a price and
an allocation rules such that both the government budget constraint (4) is
satisfied and the policy, the PS and the allocation constitute a CE.
3 Equilibrium taxation of goods
4 Equilibrium factor taxation
5 Welfare analysis
6 Incorporating fiscal discipline
In this Section commitment technologies representative of the arrangements
agreed upon by EMU member states in the original and reformed SGP
are added to the model in order to evaluate effects on social welfare of re-
designing the SGP. We assume these arrangements are able to commit society
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to future policies. As such, the analysis abstracts from time inconsistency
issues related to the possibility of non-compliance of SGP rules on the part
of any EMU member state, and focuses on RE (for more on this point, see
[5].
The addition of commitment technologies in the form of either deficit/GDP
or debt/GDP ratios is shown to imply an upper bound on the tax rate set
on capital income at early stages. This is sufficient to rule out lump-sum
taxation of the inelastically supplied capital (at time t = 1).
The commitment technology we model is fairly simple: we associate with
a given commitment an upper bound on time t=1 tax rate on capital income.
More exactly, optimal upper bounds are defined as follows
Definition 9. (Optimal Upper Bounds, OUBs.) OUBs are functions
θ̄(τ1, {πt}t=2,...,∞)
from commitments to time t = 1 tax rates on capital income such that (given
the commitment) the government budget constraint (4) holds.
OUBs are implicit in EMU fiscal discipline rules, among others. By simply
requiring EMU member states to comply with a tendency towards budget
balance coupled with a net debt position not exceeding 60% of GDP, SGP
arrangements impose an upper bound on the initial capital income tax rate
that rules out financing of total repayment of public debt through lump-sum
taxation of private assets.
We assume in the sequel that commitments are part of optimal tax se-
quences, i.e. governments do their best by committing to solutions of welfare-
loss minimization problems as stated in the next two Subsections.
6.1 The original SGP
Let commitment to the SGP consist of (τ 11 ∪ {π1t }t=2,...,∞). Then the La-
grangian is ∑∞
t=1
βtu (xt) + λ(θ − θ̄(τ 11 ∪ {π1t }t=2,...,∞)) (9)
and the maximizing sequence of tax rates {τ ∗t , θ∗t }1t=1,...,∞ is
((τ 11 , θ̄(τ
1
1 ∪ {π1t }t=2,...,∞)) ∪ {π1t }t=2,...,∞)
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6.2 The reformed SGP
Let commitment to the RSGP consist of (τ 21 ∪ {π2t }t=2,...,∞). Then the La-
grangian is ∑∞
t=1
βtu (xt) + λ(θ − θ̄(τ 21 ∪ {π2t }t=2,...,∞)) (10)
and the maximizing sequence of tax rates {τ ∗t , θ∗t }2t=1,...,∞ is
((τ 21 , θ̄(τ
2
1 ∪ {π2t }t=2,...,∞)) ∪ {π2t }t=2,...,∞).
It is immediate to verify that, as the RSGP allows for an extended time
horizon to implement a given correction of public finances, the following
inequality holds
θ̄(τ 21 ∪ {π2t }t=2,...,∞) < θ̄(τ 11 ∪ {π1t }t=2,...,∞). (11)
7 Welfare losses from the SGP
In this Section we show that both the original and the latest version of the
SGP entail upper bounds on the initial tax rate on return from capital. As
in the presence of upper bounds it is optimal to front load taxes on capital
at the maximal rate until the constraint is fulfilled, and set zero tax rate on
capital thereafter, it turns out that the reformed SGP is worse fiscal discipline
than the original SGP, as the former entails a lower upper bound on the tax
rate, and an associated prolonged phase of capital income taxation causing
an extended welfare loss.
This point can be made more explicit by focusing, e.g., on the deficit/GDP
ratio. Given the deviation of the actual ratio from its target value at time
t = 1, by allowing compliance within an extended time horizon the RSGP
entails a lower upper bound on the initial capital income tax rate. As a
consequence, efficient taxes on capital income that exceed the upper bound
must be postponed, thus entailing a distortion in relative prices that is ex-
ponentially increasing with time. The resulting saving distortion is biased
towards present consumption, thus reducing investment and growth. The
inefficiency of the RSGP (when compared to the original SGP) lies in the
fact that taxes that were efficiently front-loaded according to the SGP are
forced to postponing under the more lax regime of the RSGP.
Given the way we model commitment technologies and define policies, the
set of maximal time t = 1 implementable tax rates on capital income is given
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by θ̄(τ 21 ∪ {π2t }t=2,...,∞)∪ θ̄({π1t }). The basic result of this paper immediately
follows
Proposition 1 REs associated with the SGP entail a lower welfare loss than
REs associated with the RSGP.
Proof. This consists of showing that the sequence
((τ 21 , θ̄(τ
2
1 ∪ {π2t }t=2,...,∞)) ∪ {π2t }t=2,...,∞)
cannot be optimal. Assume it is. According to principles of optimal factor
taxation, capital income must be taxed at the maximum possible rate when
it is inelastically supplied at time t = 1. Hence, from (11) the best initial
tax rate on capital income θ∗1 must equal
max(θ̄(τ 21 ∪ {π2t }t=2,...,∞), θ̄(τ 11 ∪ {π1t }t=2,...,∞)),
i.e. θ∗1 = θ̄(τ
1
1 ∪ {π1t }t=2,...,∞), which contradicts the assumption.
8 Conclusions
The preceding analysis showed that beyond allowing for smoothing the excess
burden from additional taxation out, implementing the SGP in its revised
form also entails an inefficiently extended phase of taxation of income from
capital. When compared to the effects of the original correction procedure,
the net result on social welfare will in general be negative, as extending
capital income taxation in time tantamounts to exponentially increasing the
price of households’ future consumption.
Our model predicts that, as long as future consumption is a normal good,
countries compliant with the revised SGP will display increased current con-
sumption at the expense of long-run growth and welfare, compared to what
would occur had they complied with the original SGP. We illustrate this by
simulating EMU countries consumption and capital accumulation paths in
both cases.
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